This page contains a Flash digital edition of a book.
EDITORIAL COMMENT
Freedom “accepted”
but long-term doubts
remain
US Navy shipbuilding programmes such as the DDG 1000 continue
to suffer from fi nancial and technical problems. Now, after huge
expenditure, DDG 1000 is being cancelled.
riting this the week after only US Navy shipbuilding programme would be cancelled with just two ships
watershed events in with massive technical and financial ordered or three, but confusion remained
as to why the US Navy backed off the Wmid-September, in what has problems. When a report by the Centre
been described as the worst financial for Strategic & International Studies programme in the first place. Navy News
crisis since the 1930s, the topic of (CSIS) brands the US Navy’s shipbuild- said technical problems are at the heart
financial management must have been ing plan as a “costly illusion” that is of the problem, citing seals between the
on everybody’s mind, from individuals unaffordable and unrealistic, and says composite panels of the ship’s deckhouse.
worried about their jobs and incomes to that the US Navy’s procurement policy Navy News noted that the structure is
companies large and small and the US “is in serious disarray,” something due to be built by Northrop Grumman’s
Department of Defense (DoD). needs to change. “Unrealistic force dedicated composite facility at Gulfport,
To try to tackle the worst effects of plans, over-optimistic cost estimates, Mississippi, and is one of the major
the credit crunch, Hank Paulson, the unrealistic projections of technical changes in the DDG 1000 compared
US Treasury Secretary, wanted to create feasibility, and inadequate programme to previous warships. According to
a state-owned institution to acquire management have created an unafford- Northrop Grumman, the company’s
distressed US mortgages and securities able shipbuilding programme. This has testing programme for the composite
produced from those mortgages. At the led the US Navy to phase out capable deck house “is mature and continues to
time of writing, Mr Paulson wanted to ships for new ships that it cannot fund, meet the technical requirements of the
raise US$700 billion. Putting this into a threatening its ability to implement an design,” but one source familiar with
context that the readers of this particu- effective maritime strategy,” the CSIS the situation told Navy News that the US
lar magazine will understand, US$700 report said. Navy is so worried about the problem
billion is about 35% more than the entire Captain James Murdoch, LCS that it has been canvassing other
annual budget of the US DoD. programme manager, said delivery of manufacturers of composite structures
Against this kind of background, the Freedom was “a truly exciting day for to see whether an alternate production
problems that the US Navy seems to the Navy.” What he failed to highlight source could be found.
have in reconciling the size and shape was that - apart from the fact that the “The technical problems add another
of the fleet it would like to have and the whole LCS programme is years behind wrinkle to an already controversial
fleet that it can actually afford may seem schedule and over-budget, the US Navy programme which, after years of staunch
like small beer, but this latter problem is is actually accepting an incomplete ship. support, the US Navy essentially rejected
important in its own right. Prior to delivery, the US Navy’s Board in July,” Navy News reported, “when top
In mid-September, the US Navy’s of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) shipbuilding officials told lawmakers
Supervisor of Shipbuilding Gulf Coast conducted acceptance trials, but because that the programme was incapable of
officially accepted delivery of Freedom, the ship’s trials were conducted in Lake defeating certain enemy missiles and
the first of the US Navy’s Littoral Michigan, some ship systems, including should be cut short at just two hulls.”
Combat Ships (LCS 1), on behalf of aviation and combat systems, could not Quite how such a costly programme
the US Navy from the industry team be demonstrated. These will therefore gets as far as its has, without the realisa-
that built the ship, but this milestone have to be presented to INSURV in early tion that the ship will not actually do
in the LCS programme should not hide 2009 when trials in the open ocean can what it was designed to do becoming
the fact that the programme – and the be conducted. evident sooner, is baffling, but is
US Navy acquisition programme – is a Then there is the DDG 1000 somehow symptomatic of the way
mess. The LCS programme is a mess in programme. At the time of writing it that the US Navy acquisition process
many respects, but is far from being the was still unclear whether the programme works. WT
Warship Technology October 2008 5
WT_Oct08_p5.indd 5 10/10/08 1:10:57 PM
Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72