Feature 3
will also produce a shortfall of nuclear Capitol Hill, the report said, further 2008, as part of the proposed FY2009
submarines of up to seven boats over 12 endangering future funds. budget. Th is plan was supposed to support
years. “Th is reality-strategy disconnect in Over the last decade, US Navy force and maintain the 313-ship fl eet plan that
the entire shipbuilding programme is a planning has consisted of a series of was first presented to the Congress in
case study in failed leadership on the part annual cuts in the planned size of the 2006. Although the number of ships is
of the most senior offi cers and civilians in fleet and further delays in planned not by itself a meaningful benchmark
the US Navy,” said the report. procurement and modernisation for gauging the US Navy’s future force
“No reforms in procurement, changes – driven by failures in programme posture and capabilities, it is a symbol of
in programme management, cost management and cost containment – the problems the US Navy faces.
analysis, and test and evaluation can and current force levels are well below The Congressional Research Service
begin to compensate for taking hard and those set out in current plans. (CRS) – and almost all non-Navy experts –
realistic decisions at the top, and holding The US Navy submitted its annual believe that the current shipbuilding plan
senior flag officers, senior civilians and 30-year shipbuilding plan in February “does not include enough ships to fully
the Secretary of the Navy accountable.
The Navy’s shipbuilding efforts are –
to be charitable – a triumph of hope
over experience. The consequence is a
loss of credibility with lawmakers and
appropriators and a fleet under-equipped
to meet the strategic requirements.”
According to Kaeser, the next President
and Secretary of Defense will inherit a
defence programme where every service
has failed to contain costs to the point
where its planned procurements are
affordable, and where there is a clear tie
between its declared strategy and a force
plan it can actually execute, although, as
he noted: “The Navy is no worse in this
regard than the other services, a fact
that is all too clear from the work of the
Congressional Budget Office [CBO] and
the Government Accountability Office
[GAO], and which is described in detail
in a CSIS report ‘A Poisoned Chalice?,’
which is available at: http://www.csis.
org/media/csis/pubs/080422_fy2009_
poisoned_chalice.pdf.
Since 1987, the US Navy fleet has
reduced in size from 568 ships to
a 279-ship fleet today. The pace of
shipbuilding has slowed from 20 per year
in 1986 to eight or less since 1993. Cost
over-runs and cancellations have reduced
that number further to fi ve ships in 2007,
and the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget
request includes seven ships.
The report concludes that the US
Navy’s shipbuilding efforts - which
should provide stability, continuity, and
a blueprint for long-term fleet planning
- have instead become a major threat to
its future. Beyond the resulting shortfalls
and force cuts, the Department of the
Navy is also losing credibility with
decision-makers and appropriators on
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