Feature 3 | SHIPBUILDING
support certain elements of the 313-ship
fl eet consistently over the long run”.
According to a CRS study published
in April 2008, key mission areas such as
amphibious lift and the number of attack
submarines are likely to be affected by
funding shortfalls. Moreover, the FY2009
30-year shipbuilding plan is based
on new assumptions about extended
service life cycles for amphibious ships,
cruisers, and destroyers, and does not
seem to correct for systemic problems
in US Navy procurement efforts and
cost containment, documented by the
GAO and the CBO. Thus, the GAO
finds that “the Navy no longer appears
to have a clearly identifiable, announced
strategy for generating the funds needed After 600 engineering changes, three years of delay and two cancelled ships, the LCS is
to implement the 30-year plan,” and also costing three times initial estimates.
criticises what it called “flawed budgeting
processes and unrealistic estimates”.
The current 30-year shipbuilding plan Navy would reach the number of 313 per year. To meet the originally stated
has been unstable, and has been altered ships in 2019. However, the changes in requirement, the Navy also extended
substantially since its inception in 2006. the fleet composition introduced since the service life of the existing DDG-51
The third revision of the plan for FY2009 the US Navy originally stated its goals destroyers from 35 to 40 years.
continues that trend. Although the in 2007, entail significant shortfalls. For
total number of planned ships remains example, the 2007 shipbuilding plan also Strategy-reality disconnect
roughly the same, the composition of set forth a requirement of 88 guided- Noting that, in its view, US Navy
the planned fleet changes considerably. missile destroyers. The FY2008 plan, shipbuilding plans are now shaped more
As a result, the 30-year plan is not much however, only called for the procurement as the result of budgetary constraints than
of a plan after all, given its significant of 73 destroyers, a shortfall of 15. This as a response to strategic requirements,
qualitative annual alterations. shortfall was reduced by increasing the the CSIS report said they still seem to be
According to the FY2009 plan, the production rate of DDG(X)s to three more an expression of wishful thinking
than a realistic strategic guideline for
naval procurement.
“This will both exacerbate the Navy’s
‘strategy-reality disconnect’ and its
credibility problems with Congress and
the industry,” the report said, noting
that correcting this failure requires
the US Navy to face the need for cost
containment; to give priority to make
its procurement and force plans both
practical and affordable; and to tying all
flag rank and senior civilian promotion
and retention to actual success in
meeting these goals.
“It is not enough to announce a
strategy that talks in general terms about
regional and global deterrence, and
“wide dispersal of networked maritime
forces … the maintenance of a powerful
fleet … lethality, global reach, speed,
endurance, ability to overcome barriers
to access, and operational agility and
US Navy FY2009 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. “a robust sealift capability,” the report
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