Editorial CommEnt
Addressing the stack
weight issue
Container crushed in the stack, from the shortsea containership
Annabella.
N
ew rules are needed demanding that in the stack, and the cargo securing manual be established to the cargo owner/shipper to
all containers are weighed before was found to be ambiguous. Add to this an avoid indecision and procrastination.
stowage to validate their declared inexperienced chief officer with no previous Richard Willis, application consultant at Jade
load and allowable stack weight, in order experience of 30ft containers, commercial Software Corp said that not enough important
to avoid the potential for stacks collapsing pressures that meant there was little time for data was received or processed on vessel
onboard ship. checking, and a computer system that did
This was the consensus view emerging not include lashing requirements for in-hold
from ‘Learning from Annabella’, a one day containers, and Annabella was an accident
“Containers should
conference staged at London’s Museum in waiting to happen.
be weighed as a
Docklands in late January. The event used MAIB recommended to owners that
as its starting point the UK Marine Accident manning should be increased aboard the
standard practice”
Investigation Branch (MAIB) into an incident ship, and that its loading programme should
onboard the 868TEU UK-flag container vessel be rectified so that 30ft containers were
Annabella in February 2007. recognised. It told the ship’s charterer that 30ft structure stack weights and container allowable
On a voyage from Rotterdam and Antwerp containers should only ever be stacked three stack weights. Data that was received could be
to Helsinki, a stack of seven 30ft containers high. It recommended to the International interpreted wrongly. Terminals provided an
stowed in Annabella’s no 3 hold collapsed. Chamber of Shipping that it work with erroneous stow plan that shipboard software
While little damage was done and no-one industry to develop, then promote adherence did not correct. Allowable stack weight
suffered injuries, the outcome could have been to, a best practice safety code. (ASW) could easily be attached and recorded
catastrophic given that the top three containers But is this enough? While the misdeclaration permanently in the terminal operating system,
in the stack were carrying Butylene Gas. of container weights was not identified as an taken from a central global database. Vessel
Annabella is a modern ship, built by one of issue by MAIB, conference organiser, David planning modules could include the ASW
Germany’s leading shipbuilders and managed Cheslin, pointed out that it was known that limit calculations on every stack and provide
by a highly professional ship management shippers misdeclared the contents of containers warnings.
company. and their weight. It was also known that crews, To develop ASW calculations, what was
Stephen Clinch, deputy chief inspector particularly onboard shortsea vessels, were needed was agreement between suppliers
of MAIB said that the investigation had over-worked. on formats and interface with the database.
established that 30ft containers had been Fred Kamperman, of Polish terminal Expansion of vessel stack weight tools for
treated as though they were 40footers, and operator DCT Gdańsk, said all full containers terminal planners required cooperation with
that the loading computer had not recognised should be weighed as a standard container vessel operators, and possibly joint funding. A
30ft containers. One of the principal causes of terminal practice, in order to avoid the statutory deadline was required.
the stack collapse was that the two containers potential for misdeclaration. Such information And the technology to weigh containers is
stowed at the bottom of the stack of seven should be included in the terminal operating already available. Beat Zwygart, of Lemantec
containers were crushed by the weight of the system, with weight alarms in the control International presented the ‘Twistlock load
containers loaded above them. room. Permissible stack weights should be sensing and control system for container
The recipe for disaster was leavened as introduced into the EDI system, calling for full handling equipment’, which measures container
planners failed to act on previous alerts cooperation from all parties when cargo was weight and determines load eccentricity
from sister vessels, there were no lashings booked. A communication channel needed to without interrupting the loading cycle. NA
The Naval Architect February 2008 5
NA Feb 08 -
p5.indd 1 05/02/2008 09:29:16
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