Threat Mitigation
Airports are functionally similar. ease of access and egress and freedom of religious threat-sources, a rise in capabilities,
Customers (passengers) are transported to movement, all the more so in an together with the presence of common airport
the facility and enter a “free” area where environment where many U.S. airports are vulnerabilities, has resulted in a hitherto
security is minimised.
6
They eventually facing capacity issues. Sooner or later, the unknown level of risk. What is the use of a
present themselves for pre-board need for greater security and a sophisticated instrument dedicated to
screening, after which they enter a “sterile” commensurate need for ease of movement identifying explosives if the source agent
area, where they wait to enter a corridor clash. The fact that many similar merely blows himself up beside it? How, then,
(usually a jetway) and board the aircraft. vulnerabilities still exist in airports do we protect ourselves? And, for the
In this model, which exists in slightly throughout the country is a silent purposes of this writing, what is the overall
differing modes almost everywhere, statement of the ultimate outcome of effect on risk?
vulnerabilities do not appreciably differ these battles.
from one airport to the next. Airports are Risk
heavily regulated entities; hence, airports Threat Risk is the factor that ties vulnerability and
do not differ greatly in their security control Threat has been defined as “The potential threat together. It is, as it were, the deliverable
processes. Fences surround perimeters, for a threat-source to…exploit…a specific of the process. One definition describes risk
cameras conduct surveillance, access and vulnerability.”
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Although threats may come as “…a function of the likelihood of a given
identification systems are present, etc. from a variety of sources, as the above threat-source’s exercising a particular
This is not to suggest that airports are definition suggests, the major, consistent potential vulnerability, and the potential
identical; merely that their infrastructures threat to civil aviation since the mid-1960’s impact of that adverse threat on the
contain many common similarities. These has come from Middle Eastern-based organization.”
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commonalities result in like security terrorist groups motivated primarily by Applying our discussion to this definition, the
procedures and architectures which give political concerns. Their attacks on civil effect on risk is rather startling. If we accept
rise to similar vulnerabilities. Thus, an in- aviation targets especially, guaranteed the proposition that all airports contain similar
depth focus on airport vulnerabilities, global coverage and a means to voice their vulnerabilities, then the variable is threat.
(such as the Gore Commission example disaffections. Always high, the shift along the threat
above), without more, may not prove very As the world turns, however, threats continuum from political to religious has
productive. One alternative is to make our change. With respect to civil aviation, the created a much more lethal environment. One
airports fortresses and/or provide them hijackings and subsequent political might argue that the “likelihood” of harm has
with the latest in security technologies. statements of the past have morphed into always been high in the area of civil aviation.
Realistically, this fails on several the products of the global salafi jihad: However, never before has the “potential
accounts. Firstly, retrofitting, or even new martyrdom and explosives. Reminiscent of impact” been higher. The potential effect of
construction, rapidly becomes cost the anarchist “propaganda of the deed, the modern terrorist methodologies on the
prohibitive, especially when cutting-edge Act becomes the statement. During the aviation industry – both airport and aircraft-
technology is involved
7
. Secondly, author’s years in the FAA’s Office of Civil related – is staggering. Given this situation,
technology is not always the answer. Aviation Security, the possibility of a suicide where vulnerabilities exist throughout the
System integration is usually necessary to bomber was given short shrift, at least in system, threats are high and risks
install new technology, and is in its turn part because of the difficulty of creating unprecedented, solutions may be difficult to
expensive and often difficult to effective countermeasures. Civil aviation come by, at least through traditional methods.
accomplish. The product is not always security was, and still to a great degree is, What does one do when the risk becomes
successful and eventually, it, too, becomes predicated on the assumption that unacceptable?
obsolete, requiring a new round of attackers have a goal beyond self-
integration. And so on. Finally, civil aviation destruction. The growing inaccuracy of this
CONCLUSIONS &
and associated industry comprise one of belief has created a shift in the threat SUGGESTIONS
the great economic engines of the United paradigm, creating unique security There are some possible answers. First, we
States. Enhanced security tends to have an challenges and significantly raising the must stop fighting the last battle. Every
adverse effect on passenger facilitation, status quo ante. action need not result in a reaction, except
Another aspect of the rising threat possibly to fulfil political agendas. Airports
involves capabilities. Over the years we are vulnerable. Civil aviation is a valid
“…some airports are built
have adopted a layered, technologically- terrorist target. Incidents will occur. They
and operated as security
leveraged approach to aviation security. need not, however, necessarily be followed
The target was always the aircraft. Planes by the inevitable airport assessment/
paradigms, far less
were hijacked for a number of reasons, all threat/risk analysis. We’ve already been
vulnerable than the norm;
having to do with varying aspects of the there, and done that.
others are constructed
airplane. Given today’s model, where the Second, we must consider the possibility
explosion may be the statement, that the assessment model has given us all
with a high level of
capabilities rise significantly. Martyrs can that it can. Efforts to date have been either
passenger convenience
detonate outside of the first security layer. duplicative, forgotten, or both. It may be fair to
High explosives are not difficult to come by say that only the presence of a new,
built in, and are often far and recipes for bombs abound on the unexamined threat would justify a
more vulnerable…”
internet. reassessment of U.S. airports beyond what
The continuing movement from political to has already been accomplished. If the risks
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www.asi-mag.com February 2007 Aviationsecurityinternational
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