Threat Mitigation
in the context of airport security control measures, and equipment and operated as security paradigms, far less
assessments, is that each airport is unique technology needs.”
4
vulnerable than the norm. On the other
and requires its own individual mix of In addition to the efforts of the airport hand, some airports are constructed with
security procedures to adequately guard consortia groups, the Commission also a high level of passenger convenience
against threats. To the extent this is true; tasked FAA to conduct vulnerability studies built in, and are often far more
the argument supports security of selected domestic airports utilising vulnerable. In point of fact, many U.S.
assessments of airports on an models developed by Sandia National airports were first constructed prior to
individualised basis. Laboratories. Consequently, several the advent of any type of security and
Paradoxically, it also has the unfortunate organisations and consultancies were given have undergone a series of retrofits since
tendency to encourage a one-size-fits- all, the opportunity to conduct these their inception. In the final analysis,
reactive approach to such assessments. assessments. The final products were then however, the relative vulnerability of any
Examples include unique, single-airport examined by a “Blue Ribbon Panel” which airport is a function of the threat brought
related incidents which trigged security chose the model that panellists felt was to bear against it rather than its
assessments by the Transportation most consistent with the Commission’s goal. “vulnerability quotient” per se.
5
Thus, the
Security Administration (TSA) throughout In all cases, airports were subjected to “secure” (“invulnerable”) airport may be
the system, all focusing on the particular rigorous testing protocols, and most, if not subject to robust threats, while the
event
2
with little regard for differences. In all, major vulnerabilities were identified “unsecure” (“vulnerable”) airport may
that regard, TSA is not only fighting the last and tested. At the conclusion of the effort, face little or no threat at all. Or vice versa.
war, but the last battle. It also contradicts reports were completed and disseminated How, then, to gauge the usefulness of our
the above statement regarding the to the respective airports following a terms? Is there something that defines our
uniqueness of airports. Thus, although debrief by the contractors. The “Blue ultimate goal?
airports may be unique, resulting Ribbon Panel” was then convened by FAA The answer is found in the process, not
assessments and possible security to choose the model best adaptable to the its parts. The process of vulnerability
countermeasures suggest that they may Sandia model. assessments is to combine vulnerability
not be. It would be satisfying, if not redeeming, findings with threats to determine
When vulnerability assessments are to say that the model chosen was adopted something else, which is normally
conducted on an airport-concentric for use at all U.S. airports and eventually defined as risk. It is risk; therefore, that
basis, the results are predictable. An produced a comprehensive, adaptable set determines the true danger, irrespective
example is the effort by the FAA’s Office of data that continues to provide a basis for of an airport’s vulnerabilities in an
of Civil Aviation Security in 1997 to threat assessments. That was not to be. As assessment vacuum. The widely-
conduct vulnerability assessments of often happens in these types of situations, accepted formula of vulnerability + threat
selected airports. This initiative grew out the product of this multi-million dollar = risk defines a process that results in a
of recommendations of the White House effort became its own raison d’etre and deliverable that has meaning in a larger
Commission on Aviation Safety and went no further. context of security. However, before
Security. In its initial report, issued 9 discussing the process, an examination
September 1996, the “…most important Vulnerability, Threat and Risk of constituent parts is in order.
recommendation…” identified by the The example cited above begs the
Commission in the area of aviation question of the efficacy of such efforts in Vulnerability
security was “…that local consortia be the struggle to make air travel safer. All airports are vulnerable. Built to facilitate
convened to identify [airport] Often the products of such initiatives fail the transit of large numbers of people onto
vulnerabilities and propose action to integrate themselves into a process aircraft and to support those aircraft,
plans.”
3
which, in turn, is designed to meet airport construction often operates at
The Commission’s Final Report of 12 strategic (or operational) goals. In other cross-purposes. Although access to the
February 1997 indicated that by 2 words, what are we trying to accomplish “secure” areas of an airport are – and have
December 1996, “…all consortia plans when we examine an airports’ historically been – controlled, terminal
or reports from these airports had been vulnerabilities? Is the product intended to access has not. In fact, issues of growing
presented to the FAA for review.” The stand alone, or become integral to a capacity and customer service in
report went on to state that, “The larger scheme? Also, does the scheme competitive markets mitigate towards
consortia action plans defined local lead us somewhere we need to be? facilitating flow, not impeding it. With the
security threat conditions based on These issues clarify themselves advent of passenger screening in the late
input from FAA and the Federal Bureau somewhat when they become part of a 1970’s, airport security practitioners have
of Investigation.” Also to be assessed process geared to establishing been challenged to find the right mix of
were “…areas such as personnel something beyond vulnerability. Some security and free passage. This challenge
training, passenger screening, access airports, for example, are built and is with us today.
trianglert
1
“Assessment” used here as a catchall term for any
International Airport are representative examples. In 4
Ibid, 3.12.
inspection into relative vulnerabilities of airports,
both instances, The Transportation Security Agency 5
This assumes that such “quotients” exist; a doubtful
aircraft and associated infrastructure.
(TSA) conducted nationwide security assessments to
proposition. Quantification of such data as part of a
2
This has occurred several times over the past several
examine vulnerabilities focused on the incidents,
risk assessment process has yet to be undertaken.
years. The shooting incident at Los Angeles
reactive responses in the “one size fits all” mode. 6
3
However, as examples, CCTV, roaming patrols and
International Airport in July of 2002 and an incident
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
undercover security representatives conducting
in July 2004 where an SUV was driven into the
Security, Final Report to President Clinton, February
personality profiling may be present. (Little is really
airport terminal at Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood
12, 1997, Recommendation 3.12.
“free” anymore).
Aviationsecurityinternational February 2007 www.asi-mag.com 19
Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44