here in the U.S.?
GREENBERG: There are two reasons. Japan has got zero growth. The Japanese companies are not exactly rolling in money. They’ve been hit by this financial tsunami like everybody else has. They’re simply not going to reach. They don’t have to.
DANKWA: What about the business itself? I mean in terms of policyholders, as you know a lot of competitors are gunning for AIG’s business. Any concern that come January 1 that they might lose a chunk of this business?
GREENBERG: Look, take it piece by piece. If you’ve got life insurance you want to be sure you’re going to be with a company that’s going to be around to pay your benefits. In Asia a few weeks ago, there were policyholders lining up in front of office buildings in different countries turning in their life insurance policies. It was reported in the press. I didn’t make it up. So that’s a problem and coming back here to the United States, if you’re a D&O policyholder what do you want your policy today? If you’re a corporate buyer, what do you want your insurance? The uncertainty -- I’m not saying it’s right, I’m simply saying uncertainty creates opportunity for your competitor.
REGULATION
DANKWA: I heard you yesterday talk about mark to market. It was an interesting comment you made, observations. But maybe looking at the broader picture. Let’s look at regulation overall, what do you think could come out of this crisis? One of the things they’re talking about is regulating credit default swaps like insurance. I mean what’s your take on that and maybe talk about mark to market.
GREENBERG: Look, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with having regulation of credit default swaps. It is indeed if you look at it that way, it can be considered insurance. You’re insuring that a security is going to not default to the holder of that security, a bond usually. There ought to be capital behind that. The fear that I have is that whenever we have a crisis then we go to regulation and we’re going to probably go too far in one direction and over regulate. Regulation will never cure bad management, ever. Bad management finds ways to get around regulation.
So I think we need some regulation. We need enlightened regulation, not just more regulation. What stopped the SEC [U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission] from regulating the credit default swaps? It’s a capital market facility. Why didn’t they step up to the plate? It didn’t have to be the insurance regulators. Insurance regulation is on a state-by-state basis. This really was a national, an international market. So you could have had the SEC, you could have had some exchange where these were traded. You know there were a lot of things that could have been done, but somebody had to take the ball and do it.
DANKWA: What about mark to market? Do you think they should change the rules?
GREENBERG: Look, changing the rules now is a little late because if you change the rules now there’s going to be suspicions that you're really not telling the world what your real values are. I think it never should have been introduced in 2007. I think it should have been phased in over a period of time. It should be different for different industries. Let me give you an example. If you’re Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7