Feature 3 | rOYaL NeW ZeaLaND NaVY
The CoI also noted that prior to, and sea. However, while the ship was aware
including this incident, the RHIBs had of the MARIN report, it had no visibility
been damaged to some extent on each of any of the subsequent studies or
Operating
and every one of the open ocean passages recommended risk mitigation strategies,
undertaken by the ship in southern nor was the commanding officer aware
Limits: HMNZS
latitudes. On each occasion the ship was of the operational safety case that
operating within the required operating identifies the potential outcomes from
Canterbury
envelope for patrolling. In fact, the the hazard of water ingress into the
Court’s report indicates that this risk had RHIB alcoves.
manifested itself in a sea state as low as Rather, the CoI noted that he had according to the Concept of use
Sea State 4. ‘major concerns about the possibility of (CONuSe) for hmNZS Canterbury,
In considering whether Canterbury’s damage to fittings on the forecastle and she is to be capable of conducting
commanding officer had taken the gun when heading into heavy seas operations as follows:
ap p r o p r i at e o p e r at i o n a l r i s k [and] had also experienced severe bow a. Sea State 9 – survive and
management decisions, the CoI found slamming during the delivery voyage, continue with mission
that while the command ‘was aware of and propeller emergence was a significant b. Sea State 7 – sustain patrol
the potential for water ingress into the issue’. c. Sea State 6 – range and stow
boat alcoves,’ the consequences ‘were not In considering recommendations or Sh-2G, conduct VertreP of
fully appreciated’ as previous incidents changes that could be made to prevent personnel and stores to/from
had resulted in damage to a RHIB but a recurrence of such incidents, the CoI flight deck, launch fast rescue
not a total loss. makes it abundantly clear that the MRV boat
Model tank testing performed by design requirement demanded Canterbury d. Sea State 5 – launch, recover,
MARIN in The Netherlands had in fact to patrol in sea conditions up to the top of embark SH-2G
identified the risks of excessive rolling Sea State 7, and to survive in Sea State 9. e. Sea State 4 – launch, recover
in heavy seas from the stern quarter and It continued: ‘To patrol in Sea State minimum one sea boat, launch,
excessive pitching when heading into the 7 implies no restriction on manoeuvre recover embarked forces boats
which negates the f. Sea State 3 – suspended stern
risk mitigation ramp operations with landing
strategy of change craft, transfer of two unit loads
of heading to each weighing up to 22tonnes
avoid damage and troops and field service
to the RHIB, marching order to landing craft,
> � > � � � � � � � � � � � � � forecastle fittings, or offshore cargo operations, and
L � > � i � � � � � i � �
machinery resulting LCm launching operations using
from propeller cranes
emergence.’
Although Source: rNZN Court of Inquiry
m e a s u r e s t o
i m p r o v e t h e
securing of the caused by alcove swamping, while enabling
RHIBs are noted, the ship to operate to contracted specification
the CoI points limit, will require significant design and
out that these constructive work.’
‘will not address The range of remedial options includes
the issue of the re-siting the RHIBs higher up in the ship;
i > � � � i � \
RHIB’s flooding, adding a door or wave deflection device to
U � � � > � � V � � � V � � > � i
which will have stop significant water ingress to the alcoves;
U � / � � � � � } � i � � V i
the same impact or so significantly altering the ship’s motions
U � � V � � � } � i � � V i
on operational that waves will not ingress the alcove.
i � V � � � � i � � � � v �
� - � � � i � �
U � - � � V � � * � � � v
availability as the In a separate incident on 5 October
* � V � � �
i � � � i � � � > � i � � � � � � L V � � � � > V � � � � � � � , � � � � � , � � V i �
complete loss of a 2007, a sailor was drowned when a RHIB
v � � � � � i � / � � i � { x � * � � } � > � � i
RHIB’. capsized alongside Canterbury. The RNZN
The COI added: has blamed this accident on the failure of a
� � � � ` i � � � i � � L � > � i � � V � �
i � � � i � � � > � i � � ] � - � � v > � � � � B } i � � � ] � -
� � � � � � � � 1 ] � - 7
‘The complete quick-release shackle, which is now being
* � � � i \ � � { � � � � � � n � � � � x � ] � > � \ � � { � � � � � � � � � � � � �
elimination of the replaced on all naval vessels, rather than
� � > � � \ � � � v � J ` i � � � i � � L � > � i � � V � �
risk of damage any design issue affecting the MRV. WT
22 Warship Technology May 2008
WT May 08 - p21+
22.indd 22 23/04/2008 16:16:19
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