The Final Word
A Personal View
expressed by Rear Admiral (Retired)
Cathal “Irish” Flynn
“...if defences against IEDs in baggage or cargo, or on
passengers, are made more robust, might not the terrorists shift
to attacking the airliners with missiles? If we then deploy
effective missile countermeasures, mightn’t the terrorists resort
to crude, bloody attacks in airport terminals..”
Human life is so precious, and terrorist regime’s effectiveness against the and it identified distinctive
attacks are so atrociously destructive, possible presence of terrorist “insiders” characteristics of U.S. terrorists and
that we instinctively avoid explicit among the hundreds of thousands of persons prone to recruitment into
consideration of limits on what we will pay employees of shipping entities, freight terrorism, then effective background
to protect the former and prevent the forwarders, and haulers who have access checks might be developed to establish
latter. But we ourselves do have implicit to the cargo. the trustworthiness (absence of the
limits to the cost in money and Since 9/11, our intelligence agencies characteristics of terrorist affiliations or
inconvenience that we will bear. It seems have searched intensively within the propensities) of cargo system employees,
to me that the hardest task in policy for United States for indications of home- and thus permit retention of a
aviation security is setting the limits. grown terrorism and linkages to dependable Known Shipper regime,
Consider those in U.S. defence against international terrorist organisations. On without having to incur the costs of
bombing of airliners. 14 March 2007, Mr. Charles Allen, Chief inspecting most cargo.
The United States Congress is now Intelligence Officer of the Department of Not having a reliable assessment of
considering a Bill that would require Homeland Security, testifying to a Senate terrorist characteristics and capabilities in
inspection (using explosive detection Committee, commented on the the United States, we have to rely on
systems, other X-ray equipment, dangerous linkages between radicals in informed imagination of attacks that
explosives trace detectors, canines, or by Europe and al-Qaeda and said that these might be attempted, and the list of them
manual search) of all cargo before it is types of linkages with international is very long. If defences against IEDs in
loaded onto passenger flights. If the Bill is terrorist groups have not been seen in the baggage or cargo, or on passengers, are
enacted, it will bring about a substantial United States. Mr. Allen also said that our made more robust, might not the
change to the cargo security regime, government is only in the early stages terrorists shift to attacking the airliners
which has hitherto relied primarily on (more than five years after 9/11!) of with missiles? If we then deploy effective
Known Shipper procedures. The Bill understanding radicalisation in the United missile countermeasures, mightn’t the
concentrates on protection of airliners States and its possible motivation of terrorists resort to crude, bloody attacks
flying within the United States, but its terrorism. in airport terminals, in the manner of the
ramifications would almost certainly In a less imperfect world, the U. S. 1985 attacks in Rome and Vienna
require changes in the cargo security government would have by now (“now” airports? And so on...
programmes for international flights to being further from 9/11 than VJ Day was Frank P. Harvey has written that, “The
and from this country. from Pearl Harbor) produced a reliable real problem today, then, is not the
The emphasis on strengthening cargo assessment of terrorism and terrorist ‘failure of imagination’, it is the
security stems from considering the capabilities in the United States. If the ‘imagination of failure.’” (The Homeland
threat of IEDs comprehensively. There is a assessment indicated that terrorists Security Dilemma; the Imagination of
concern that the post-9/11 were capable of placing, recruiting, or Failure and the Escalating Cost of
implementation of 100% inspection of coercing employees in the air cargo Perfecting Security,” Canadian Defence &
hold baggage, together with improved pre- chain, who could then insert IEDs into Foreign Affairs Institute, June 2006.) He
board screening of passengers and cabin items intended to be carried on sums up the security dilemma in a brief
luggage, might cause terrorists to shift to passenger flights, then there would be a thesis: “the more security you have, the
cargo as the means of getting IEDs onto solid basis for determining Known more security you will need.”
passenger airliners. The emphasis on Shipper’s ineffectiveness and mandating It is “Harvey’s Dilemma” that makes
inspection stems from insufficient inspection in its place. However, if the setting the limits the hardest task of
confidence in any Known Shipper intelligence were of even higher quality, security policy.
48 April 2007 Aviationsecurityinternational
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