Lead Editorial
loads of multi-national passengers to the
“…the reason we don’t
serious need for some fresh thinking about
United States. It will try, try, and try again. our global approach to tackling the problem.
It is often said that the best security
pose the question is
That means going back to basics and
programmes are those that are re-written questioning the efficacy of every element of
from scratch. They are like suits. For quality, because we are afraid the defence strategy. It means there are no
one goes to a tailor who will design, cut and “givens”, no “that’s the way we do things”,
fit the product until the customer is
of the answer…”
and no “bolt-on solutions”.
satisfied. On the other hand, if one desires Terrorists are a little like spiders. They lurk
something cheap yet acceptable to the operandi that they have not even in the shadows, they creep quietly and are
masses, one can buy an off-the-shelf considered. Where’s the logic in that? never heard, they weave webs to snare their
product and accept its limitations. By taking Surely, if we are to test the system, as we enemy, they are small in size yet frighten the
“model” programmes, cutting and pasting should be doing on a daily basis, we should masses, their elite forces have a deadly bite
seemingly pertinent clauses into a be doing so as if we want to penetrate the and, when they fall, they try, try, and try again.
document, one meets the core international system as a whole? Indeed, the saying “if at first you don’t
or national requirements, yet does not For far too many airports, airlines and even succeed, try, try and try again”, is attributed
necessarily have a quality programme. regulators, aviation security has become one to Scotland’s Robert the Bruce who, whilst
Meeting the international requirements big tick-box (check-box) exercise. Do we have hiding in a cave contemplating his future,
stipulated by ICAO’s Annex 17 to the Chicago an airport security programme? Do we test was inspired to fight on for Scottish
Convention, ECACs Doc 30 or other our screeners? Do we effect background independence from England when he saw a
legislation may be laudable, but is it effective checks? Do we screen all checked luggage? spider continually fall, yet repeatedly try
in meeting the challenges of the threat we Do we issue vehicle passes to airside again to achieve its goal.
face 24/7 in the 21st Century? I think not. vehicles? And so on… Yet how often do we Yet, like spiders, the terrorist under
Standardised testing of screeners may be ask ourselves the question, “does the surveillance, whilst unnerving, is defeatable.
“fair” for the operatives themselves, but not system as a whole actually do what is it Unlike spiders, today’s terrorist may change
for society as a whole. Take Threat Image supposed to do and prevent all acts of its tactics, whilst maintaining a common
Projection (TIP) as an example. We test our unlawful interference with civil aviation”? goal. In response we need fluid tactics,
X-ray operators with concealments that they I submit that the reason we don’t pose the unconstrained by standard response
should be able to detect rather than testing question is because we are afraid of the formulae, political correctness and dumbed-
all of our screeners with terrorist modus answer and that, consequently, there is a down methodologies…
Aviationsecurityinternational April 2007 3
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